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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Federal Law Held To Govern Effect of the Release 
of a Joint Tortfeasor in Private Antitrust 
Suit-Winchester Drive-in Theatre, Inc. 
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Co.* 
Private antitrust litigation occasionally raises the question of 
whether state or federal law should be applied to determine the 
effect of the release of a joint tortfeasor. When federal law is ap-
plied, as it was in Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Twentieth 
Century-Fox Film Co.,1 there remains the necessity of formulating a 
rule of federal law, since there appears to be no established federal 
rule governing releases in antitrust suits.2 
The determination of whether state or federal law is to be ap-
plied to a collateral issue arising under a federal statute depends 
upon the relationship of that issue to the purpose, policy, and scope 
of the legislation.3 State law will readily be adopted unless the mat-
ter is so intimately connected with a general federal program that 
congressional intent would be subverted by an application of diverse 
local rules. 4 When the policy of the statute does not provide the 
court with any specific guidelines, a well-established state rule may 
offer a convenient alternative to the difficult task of judicial legisla-
tion.5 However, when federal interest predominates6 or when the 
• 232 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Cal. 1964). 
1. 232 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Cal. 1964). 
2. Compare Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 249 F.2d 5 (.!Id Cir. 
1957) (following the rule set forth in Restatement of Torts), with Hilton, Inc. v. 
Triangle Publications, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (following the distinction 
between release and covenant not to sue). A case occasionally cited as setting forth the 
"federal rule" is McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943), which followed the 
intent-full compensation test. See text accompanying note 21 infra. However, this 
case did not arise under a federal statute, and it is usually cited in connection with 
general tort actions. It is either implicitly rejected or not mentioned in many anti-
trust cases. See cases cited note 9 infra. 
3. See generally Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law"-Competence and Dis-
cretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 
(1957); Comment, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1955); Note, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 465 (1941); 
Note, 59 HAR.v. L. REv. 966 (1946). 
4. This practice is followed under the Federal Tort Claims Act where the applica-
tion of state law is clearly preferable to a separate "federal tort law." See, e.g., 
Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963); Matland v. United States, 285 
F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1961). 
5. For example, when the federal act fails to specify a statute of limitations, the 
question is usually regarded as one of local law. This was the prevailing situation under 
the antitrust laws prior to the enactment by Congress of a uniform statutory period. 
See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); Barnes 
Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1942); Note, 53 
CoLUM. L. REv. 68 (1953); Note, 60 YALE L.J. 553 (1951). State law has also been utilized 
to decide collateral issues arising under federal statutes such as the Bankruptcy Act 
(Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940)) (effect of a deed); Ta.x 
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purpose of a statute can be achieved only through a comprehensive 
system of uniform national regulation, collateral issues are governed 
by federal law.7 If the determination has been made that the area 
is exclusively federal, it becomes the responsibility of the federal 
courts to fashion a rule designed to effectuate the policy of the 
statute, independent of existing state law.8 
It is presently unsettled whether the effect of the release of a 
joint tortfeasor in a private action brought under the federal anti-
trust laws is of sufficient federal concern to dictate the application 
of federal rather than state law. Courts applying state law treat the 
problem in substantially the same manner as that of any other re-
lease; they do not discuss choice of law alternatives, despite the 
fact that the action is based upon a federal statute rather than a 
common-law tort.9 Implicit in these decisions is the assumption 
that the release issue is not encompassed within the comprehensive 
scheme of antitrust regulation. Similarly, in those cases where the 
effect of a release has been regarded as a matter of federal law, the 
single fact that the cause of action arises from a federal statute has 
been determinative, without further analysis of the relationship of 
the collateral issue to the overall program.10 The approach of the 
(Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938)) (determination of heirs according to state law, but 
application of exemption in statute governed by federal law); Bank Act (Reno Nat'l 
Bank v. Seaborn, 99 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1938)) (segregation of funds for a trust). 
6. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme 
8: Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) (concurring opinion). Federal law may be 
held controlling even in the absence of a specific statute. See, e.g., Howard v. Lyons, 
360 U.S. 593 (1959); United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Royal Indem. 
Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Note, 53 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 991 (1953); Note, 
59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946). 
7. E.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal courts 
required to fashion federal common law of arbitration based on policy of national 
labor laws); Dice v. Akron, C. &: Y. Ry., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (validity of release in FELA 
action held a matter of federal law). In O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 
539 (1st Cir. 1940), it was held that the defense of privilege for a defamatory telegraph 
message was to be determined by federal common law since the Communications Act 
indicated an intent by Congress to institute a comprehensive system of regulation 
which required a uniform rule. 
8. The federal act may thus preclude defenses which could be exerted under state 
law. See, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (Sherman Act); 
Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942) (Bankruptcy Act); D'Oench, 
Duhme &: Co v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (Federal Reserve Act); Deitrick v. Greaney, 
309 U.S. 190 (1940) (Bank Act). 
9. Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 249 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1957) 
(assumed state and federal law identical); Eagle Lion Films Inc. v. Loews Inc., 219 F.2d 
196 (2d Cir. 1955) (contract stipulated that it was to be governed by state law); Duffy 
Theatres v. Griffith Consol. Theatres, 208 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1953); Suckow Borax 
Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950); Solar Elec. Corp. v. 
General Elec. Co., 156 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Pa. 1957). 
10. E.g., Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961). In Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1960), holding 
(by analogy to FELA actions) that federal law did not require a tender back of 
consideration in order to repudiate a release allegedly induced by fraud, the court 
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Winchester court in concluding that federal law should control and 
in selecting a governing rule from among the divergent state rules 
represents the first real judicial attempt to correlate federal anti-
trust policy with the choice of law rules as they both relate to the 
effect of the release of a joint tortfeasor. 
The court in Winchester found the application of federal law 
necessary to the enforcement of a uniform federal antitrust policy. 
This conclusion seems valid because the application of state law 
would cause a geographical disparity resulting from the wide di-
versity of local rules regarding the release of a joint tortfeasor.11 
This conclusion is also supported by other considerations. It is clear 
that the application of state law would prolong antitrust litigation 
with complex collateral issues due to the presently unsettled nature 
of choice of law rules.12 Further, the increasing emphasis on the law 
of the forum in modern theories of conflict of laws13 would often 
provide the opportunity for the litigant to engage in forum-shopping 
if state law were to govern the effect of a release. Similar considera-
tions prompted Congress to enact a uniform statute of limitations 
for private antitrust litigation14 and led the United States Supreme 
Court to adopt federal law as controlling the effect of a release of 
a joint tortfeasor in actions under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act.15 It is of course true that a determination that federal law 
should govern will not in itself produce national uniformity, be-
cause the federal courts may adopt differing rules as the controlling 
federal law.16 The application of federal law is, nevertheless, a neces-
sary first step on the path to the desired uniformity that can probably 
be obtained only at the national level.17 
concluded that the area was "dominated by the sweep of federal statutes." Presumably 
the effect on the remaining defendants of a valid release would also be a matter of 
federal law, although this question was not decided and the court regarded federal 
and state law as the same for the purpose of this case. Occasionally a court will adopt a 
rule without specifying whether state or federal law is being applied. See, e.g., Lysfjord 
v. Flintkote, 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 246 F.2d 368 
(9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Combined Bronx Amusements, Inc. v. 
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
11. 232 F. Supp. 556, 561 (N.D. Cal. 1964). See notes 18-22 infra and accompanying 
text. 
12. See generally Ehrenzweig, Release of Concurrent Tortfeasors in the Conflict 
of Laws-Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 46 VA. L. R.Ev. 712 (1960); Wade, 
Joint Tortfeasors and the Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. R.Ev. 464 (1953); Note, 60 
CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 522 (1960); Note, 15 OKLA. L. REv. 38 (1962); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1034 
(1960). See also Arr'y GEN. NAT'L Cm,n.r. ANTITRUST REP. 380-81 (1955) [hereinafter cited 
as Attorney General's Report] (regarding choice of law problems existing prior to enact• 
ment of a statute of limitations for antitrust litigation). 
13. E.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Griffin v. Mccoach, 313 U.S. 
498 (1941). See generally CURRIE, SELECTED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1963). 
14. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1958). See Attorney General's Report 380-85. 
15. Dice v. Akron, C. &: Y. Ry., 342 U.S. 359 (1951); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1213 
(1959). 
16. See note 2 supra. 
17. The Winchester court fully recognized the lack of uniformity among state 
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The prevailing practice among federal courts, however, is the 
application of state rather than federal law. The majority view 
among the states follows the strict common-law rule that a general 
release of one tortfeasor operates to release all others, unless the 
instrument can be construed as a covenant not to sue.18 Many states, 
however, modify this rule by providing that an express reservation 
of rights against the remaining defendants will prevent total dis-
charge.19 Considerable criticism has been directed at the strict com-
mon-law rule,20 and a minority of states now adhere to the more 
modem view that the effect of a release is a question of the intent 
of the parties and of whether full compensation has been received.21 
The Winchester court selected as the controlling federal rule 
this modem view as it is incorporated in section 4 of the Uniform 
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act,22 which specifically pro-
vides that an express reservation is not required in order to preserve 
the plaintiff's claim against nonsignatory defendants.28 
The court is to be commended for discarding, in its search for 
a uniform rule for the antitrust laws, the older rules which can 
and federal courts and attached to its opinion a Certificate of Probable Cause suggesting 
an immediate appeal in order to "materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation •.•• " 232 F. Supp. 556, 563 (N.D. Cal. 1964). One might predict that the 
release issue in antitrust litigation will eventually follow the same path toward 
uniformity as releases in FELA actions. 
18. PROSSER, TORTS§ 46 (lid ed. 1964); Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 410-13 (1960). 
19. Id. at 413-15. This is also the position taken by the REsTATEMENT, TORTS 
§ 885(1) (1939): "A valid release of one tortfeasor from liability for a harm, given by 
the injured person, discharges all others liable for the same harm, unless the parties to 
the release agree that the release shall not discharge the others and, if the release is 
embodied in a document, unless such agreement appears in the document." However, 
where the defendants can be classified as independent rather than joint tortfeasors, the 
rule does not apply. E.g., Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 150 F. Supp. 79 (W.D. Pa. 
1957); Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944). Contra, Rushford v. 
United States, 92 F. Supp. 874 (N.D.N.Y. 1950), afj'd, 204 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1953). 
20. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 931-35 (1951); HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 10.1 (1956); 
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 18, § 46; Havighurst, The Effect of a Settlement With 
One Co-obligor Upon the Obligations of Others, 45 CORNELL L.Q. I (1959); Prosser, 
Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 
1213 (1959); NoTE, 12 VAND L. REv. 1414 (1959). Avoidance of the common-law rule by 
the device of a covenant not to sue has also been recognized as an artificial legal techni-
cality based more on semantics than substance. See, e.g., McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 
659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945); 
Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 
146 A.2d 665 (1958). 
21. Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 422-31 (1960). Some courts take the position that 
receipt of full compensation is the controlling test. E.g., Bolton v. Ziegler, Ill F. Supp. 
516 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); Derby 
v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 187 N.E.2d 556 (1962); Note, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1142 (1963). 
22. 9 U.L.A. 242 (1957) [hereinafter cited as the Uniform Act). 
23. "A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after 
judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but 
reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid 
for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the 
total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid." Ibid. 
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provide a "giant trap for the unwary."24 However, the selection of 
the original version of the Uniform Act as the controlling federal 
rule is questionable.25 It would seem preferable tq adopt the 1955 
revised version,26 which eliminated a provision subjecting the re-
leased tortfeasor to liability for contribution and added a require-
ment that releases must be given in good faith.27 These changes 
were intended to encourage out-of-court settlements by providing 
releases with finality while prohibiting collusive agreements.28 
The trebling of damages in antitrust suits29 raises significant 
problems with regard to the manner in which the out-of-court settle-
ment should affect the continuing liability of the tortfeasor not re-
leased. First, it must be determined whether the plaintiff's claim 
against the non-released tortfeasor is to be reduced by the pro-rata 
share of the released tortfeasor3° or by the actual amount received 
in settlement. Second, it must be determined whether the credit 
is to be applied before or after the court trebles the plaintiff's dam-
ages. If the judgment is credited to the extent of the released tort-
feasor's pro-rata share, it obviously makes no difference whether 
the credit is applied before or after the damages are trebled.31 How-
ever, this could result in a substantial decrease in the satisfaction a 
claimant would otherwise receive if he accepts an amount from the 
released tortfeasor below the amount of his pro-rata share, which 
can be finally determined only by the judgment.82 The develop-
24. Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Co., 232 
F. Supp. 556, 561 (N.D. Cal. 1964). 
25. Only eight states have enacted this version of the Uniform Contribution Among 
Joint Tortfeasors Act, and of these only three states have retained the act in anything 
like its original form. See 9 U.L.A. 116•17 (Supp. 1964) (Commissioners' Note). No 
other federal court has adopted the Uniform Act for antitrust cases. 
26. Id. at 122. 
27. It is interesting to note that California has enacted a variation of the 1955 
Uniform Act (CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 877) and therefore, in terms only of the effect 
given to a general release, the result in the Winchester case would have been the same 
under state law. For a comparison of the California statute with the original Uniform 
Act, see Comment, 9 HAs:rlNGs L.J. 180 (1958). 
28. 9 U.L.A. 123 (Supp. 1964) (Commissioners' Note). 
29. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). 
30. For example, if plaintiff releases one of two defendants for $10,000 and then 
recovers $30,000 against the other, the released defendant's pro-rata share of $15,000 is 
deducted from the verdict. See, e.g., Judson v. Peoples Bmk Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 
HO A.2d 24 (1954); Smootz v. Ienni, 37 N.J. Super. 529, Il7 A.2d 675 (L. 1955). Cf. 
Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956). See generally Note, 35 
N.C.L. R.Ev. 141 (1956); Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 533 (1958). 
31. Taking the example of note 30, if the credit is applied before trebling, the 
$30,000 judgment is reduced to $15,000 and then trebled to $45,000. If the credit is 
applied after trebling, the trebled judgment of $90,000 is reduced to $45,000. 
32. Taking the example of note 30 supra, plaintiff is entitled to $90,000, yet after 
deduction of the released defendant's pro-rata share he would be allowed to recover half 
this sum of $45,000 which, added to the $10,000 already received in settlement, makes 
his total satisfaction only $55,000. See Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 
A.2d 730 (1956) (dissenting opinion). 
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ment of antitrust laws favorable to the plaintiff,33 more liberal re-
quirements for proof of damages,34 and the award of attorney's fees35 
suggest that a plaintiff would not often be willing to settle when the 
cost to him of undervaluing the liability of the released tortfeasor 
would be multiplied threefold under the pro-rata share technique. 
If, on the other hand, the actual consideration received in settlement 
is credited against the plaintiff's claim, it becomes quite important 
whether this is done before or after the trebling of damages. If de-
ducted before the trebling of damages, the claimant runs the same 
risk of a substantial diminution in his total recovery that he en-
counters under the pro-rata share method. If, however, the credit 
is applied after the trebling of damages, the entire burden of the 
punitive damages may be cast upon the non-released tortfeasors. For 
example, in Lysfjord v. Flintkote,36 plaintiff recovered twenty thou-
sand dollars in settlement from the released parties and subsequently 
recovered a fifty thousand dollar verdict against the remaining de-
fendant. It was held that the twenty thousand dollar consideration 
for the release should be deducted from the trebled damages of 150,-
000 dollars rather than from the actual damages on the ground that 
the trebled verdict represented the full satisfaction to which plaintiff 
was entitled.37 Thus, the non-released defendant was held liable 
for a substantial proportion of the actual damages as well as the 
entire 100,000 dollars in punitive damages. Arguably, one defendant 
should not be so heavily penalized due to outside agreements over 
which he has no control.38 Of course, a continuing liability for con-
tribution from the released tortfeasor could eliminate this inequity, 
but if the release does not operate to dispose of the matter with 
finality, there is no reason why a tortfeasor would not personally de-
fend in an attempt to reduce the damages. 
The 1955 revision of the Uniform Act adopts the view that the 
consideration for the release is deducted from the final judgment and 
33. E.g., simplification of proof of conspiracy, growth of offenses illegal per se, a 
broadened concept of interstate commerce, and increased potential liability under the 
Robinson-Patman Act. OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 1035 n.6 (2d ed. 1959). 
34. See, e.g., Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio-Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Bordonaro Bros. 
Theatres v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 176 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1949); William Goldman 
Theatres v. Loew, Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945). See generally Clark, The Treble 
Damage Bonanza-New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH. L. 
REv. 363 (1954). 
35. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U .S.C. § 15 (1958). 
36. 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957). 
37. This method was strongly approved on appeal, and was also discussed and fol-
lowed in Bal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708, 714-16 
(N.D. Cal. 1962). 
38. The discrepancy between amounts paid by released and nonreleased defendants 
has been justified as an inducement to settle. See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 665 
(D.C. Cir. 1943), for a general discussion of the alternative methods of awarding 
damages where a joint tortfeasor is released. 
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the released tortfeasor is discharged from all liability for contribu-
tion, so long as the release was made in good faith. 89 Since the puni-
tive damage aspect of private antitrust suits has been recognized 
as an effective means of promoting private enforcement of the anti-
trust laws, 40 the 1955 revision seems consonant with sound antitrust 
policy.41 The plaintiff can freely execute a release without fear of 
discharging the nonsignatory tortfeasors or sacrificing a part of his 
eventual satisfaction, and the nonliability of the released defendant 
for contribution is a strong incentive for out-of-court settlement. 
It is clear that the equitable application of the revised act de-
pends upon the rigorous enforcement of its requirement of good 
faith, which constitutes the only protection afforded non-released 
defendants against collusion between the plaintiff and the released 
defendant.42 This safeguard might be strengthened by placing the 
burden of proof upon the plaintiff to establish that the release was 
entered into in good faith once the nonsignatory defendants demon-
strate a substantial disproportion between the pro-rata shares and 
the consideration given for the release. Strict enforcement of the 
good faith requirement of the revised 1955 Uniform Act will prevent 
collusive agreements without subverting the general policy of pro-
moting the private enforcement of the antitrust laws. 
39. Uniform Act § 4, 9 U.L.A. 122 (Supp. 1964). 
40. Lysfjord v. Flintkote, 246 F.2d !168 (9th Cir. 1957); Bal Theatre Corp. v. 
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Cal. 1962). 
41. But see Attorney General's Report !179 recommending the vesting of discretion 
in the trial judge to impose double or treble damages in order to penalize willful 
violators without imposing the harsh penalty of multiple damages on innocent 
offenders. 
42. The dangers of a release of one tortfeasor for a nominal amount because of 
business reasons were alleviated under the original Uniform Act by the objective 
requirement of contribution. See generally the discussion of the reasons for changing to 
the more subjective standard of good faith in the Commissioners' Note to the revised 
Act, 9 U.L.A. 122-2!1 (Supp. 1964). 
